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I. INTRODUCTION
In his tenth Term as Chief Justice, John G. Roberts Jr. presided
over what one noted constitutional scholar is calling "the most pro-
gressive Term" in the last forty years.1 The political scientists will dis-
sect the decisions and the alignments of the various justices for years
to come. Regardless of the accuracy of the "most progressive" claim,
some of the most noteworthy cases of the Term dealt with hot button
. Professor of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law.
1. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Return of the Jedi: The Progressive October 2014 Term, 18
GREEN BAG 2D 363 (2015); see also Jonathan Ross Harkavy, 2015 Supreme Court Employment
Law Commentary (Aug. 25, 2015), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract-2655765> (for a view
focusing just on workplace law cases).
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social issues such as same sex marriage, the First Amendment, and
civil rights.2 Even these cases, as I will discuss below, have ramifica-
tions in the labor and employment law world.
When looking at the labor and employment cases, however, the
usual ideological alignments do not always apply. Workplace law cas-
es generally make up a small percentage of the Court's docket (this
Term, about 11 percent of the seventy-five merits cases).3 Because
workplace law cases usually involve issues of statutory construction
rather than constitutional interpretation, it is hard to characterize the
Term as "liberal" or "conservative" for workplace law. Although, the
traditional ideological lines can often predict whether a decision will
be pro-employer or pro-worker, the cases this Term did not always
lend themselves to those ideological labels. But this apparent consen-
sus on the Court might be misleading. Labor law - the highly polar-
ized field of union-management collective bargaining in the private
and public sectors - has declined as a portion of the Court's docket
for many years. This year, there was only one decision involving col-
lective bargaining, and it was more technical than the divided deci-
sions involving public employees of the last few years.4 In other
words, the trend of decreasing labor cases has continued.5 Without a
blockbuster public-sector labor case in the October 2014 Term, most
of the action was in employment discrimination, wage and hour law,
and benefits. Nevertheless, there were several labor and employment
decisions in areas where there has been a significant amount of litiga-
tion in recent years.6 My review of the Supreme Court's October 2014
Term will focus on cases involving workplace law statutes such as the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), the Labor Management Relations Act
of 1947 (LMRA) and the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989
(WPA).7 These cases can be viewed through the lens of the following
2. See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct 2584 (2015); Reed v. Town of Gilbert,
Ariz., 135 S. Ct 2218 (2015); Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct 1645 (2015).
3. See SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES BLOG (last viewed Dec. 1, 2015),
<http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/terms/ot2014/> (comprehensive data and analysis on the
October 2014 term).
4. See M & G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct 926 (2015).
5. The most recent labor case was from the October 2012 Term. See UNITE HERE Lo-
cal 355 v. Mulhall, 134 S. Ct. 594 (2013) (pledge of employer neutrality is not necessarily an ille-
gal gift to an employer violating section 302; petition dismissed as improvidently granted).
6. There were a number of cases that could have labor and employment implications in
the October 2014 term that will not be discussed in this review.
7. This Review will not address the case brought under the Employee Retirement and
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Tibble v. Edison Int'l, 135 S. Ct. 1823 (2015), because
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trends: 1) the Court continues its judicial narrowing of the Fair Labor
Standards Act and federal labor law; 2) plaintiffs who have the back-
ing of the administrative agencies are more likely to be successful;
and 3) some justices are concerned that the Court will not adequately
check the power of these in the future. These trends can be seen in
the following cases.
II. WORKPLACE LAW CASES IN THE 2014 TERM
A. Integrity Staffing Solutions: Minutes Spent for the Benefit of the
Employer?
With the volume of litigation under the FLSA increasing each
year, it is not a surprise that the number of FLSA cases in the Su-
preme Court has also been steady each year. Last year, the Court de-
cided Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp.' and two years before, Christopher
v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.9 In both of those cases, the Court ruled
against the employees. l That trend continued in this Term. The Court
decided Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk relatively early in the
Term, in part because it was the first labor case argued in the Term
and in part because the result was unanimous.11 In this case, ware-
house employees sued for compensation for the time they spent going
through security checks at a Reno, Nevada area warehouse that con-
tracted with Amazon.com and other retailers. 12 Plaintiffs in this case
worked in a warehouse in Nevada filling orders for Amazon.com
among other clients.13 The whole process of waiting to pass through
the security checkpoint could take up to twenty-five minutes because
the workers had to remove their keys, wallet and belts and pass
through a metal detector and also possibly be searched.14 Up to ten
minutes of their lunchtime were also used for this process.15 Plaintiffs
alleged that the practices were violations of the FLSA and Nevada
wage law.
16
that case is less about workplace law than the investment practices of ERISA plans.
8. 134 S. Ct. 870 (2014).
9. 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
10. Id.
11. See 135 S. Ct. 513 (2014).
12. Id. at 515.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Busk v. Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc., 713 F.3d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 2013), rev'd, 135 S.
Ct. 513 (2014).
16. Integrity Staffing Solutions, 135 S. Ct. at 515.
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The employees wanted to receive compensation for waiting in
line for the security checks, which the employer required to prevent
the theft of merchandise." The Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, which
prevents the employee from receiving the compensation for time
spent "preliminary" and "postliminary"18 to the worker's principal ac-
tivities, did not answer the question of whether standing in line at a
security check should be considered compensable "hours worked." 9
Justice Thomas wrote the opinion for the Court, holding that the
time spent by warehouse workers undergoing security screen means is
not compensable under the FLSA. ° Justice Thomas wrote that the
screenings were not a principal activity nor integral to the employees'
principal duties therefore they were not compensable.1 Justice So-
tomayor, joined by Justice Kagan, concurred in the judgment because
the employer could have dispensed with the security screens without
impairing job safety or effectiveness.22 In contrast to the Court's 2005
decision in IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 3 which held that this donning and
doffing of safety gear for meatpackers was integral and indispensable
as a safety matter, the Court here held that there was no safety rea-
son.' The case also might have reminded some of last Term's FLSA
case Sandifer v U.S. Steel Corp., where the Court ruled against the
plaintiffs on the meaning of "clothes" in another section of the
FLSA 5 With a case interpreting the FLSA each Term, wage and
hour law is a regular part of Court's workplace law docket, and wage
and hour law occupies a large share of employment litigation in the
federal courts.
B. Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association: Feigned Unanimity?
The employees in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association fared
better in this FLSA case with the support of an administrative agency
- but there was still skepticism of the agency's authority. 6 Perez
turned on the authority of the Secretary of Labor, Tom Perez, to in-
17. Id. at 515-16.
18. 29 U.S.C. § 254 (2012).
19. See Integrity Staffing, 135 S. Ct. at 515.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 518.
22. Id.
23. 546 U.S. 21 (2005).
24. Integrity Staffing, 135 S. Ct. at 520.
25. 134 S. Ct. 870 (2014).
26. See 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015).
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terpret the FLSA.27 The DOL's original case involved the exemptions
to overtime for those employed in a bona fide executive administrator
or professional capacity, but the case reached the Supreme Court on
the question of administrative law.28 In 2006, the Department of La-
bor issued an opinion letter that stated that mortgage loan officers
were within the administrative exemption and thus not eligible for
overtime pay.29 With the new administration and a new Secretary of
Labor taking over in 2009, the Deputy Administrator of the DOL de-
clared in 2010 that the mortgage loan officers did not qualify for the
administrative exemption.3 ° The Mortgage Bankers Association sued
the DOL, arguing that the DOL's interpretation was invalid because
the agency did not go through the notice and comment period re-
quired by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).31 The issue was
whether notice and comment was required for a new interpretation of
an agency rule.32 All the members of the court answered "no" in an
opinion authored by Justice Sotomayor,33 but three justices (Scalia,
Thomas and Alito) expressed concerns of the potential ramifications
of the decision.34 While previous precedents required agencies to use
notice and comment procedures when making significant changes to
previous interpretations, the Court found those precedents to be in-
consistent with the plain language of the APA35 providing for notice
and comment only when legislative rules have the "force and effect of
law. 3 6 The Court was not concerned by the Mortgage Brokers' argu-
ment that agencies will try to change substantive rules under the guise
of interpretations.3
Three justices wrote separately but concurred in the judgment.38
Justice Scalia voiced his concern that administrative agencies would
take advantage to interpret their own rules, as The Mortgage Bankers
27. Id. at 1204.
28. Id. at 1203.
29. Id. at 1205.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1206; see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (2012).
32. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1205.
33. Id. at 1203.
34. Id. at 1210-25.
35. Id. at 1205-06 (citing Alaska Prof'l Hunters Assn., Inc. v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030, 1034
(D.C. Cir. 1999)).
36. Id. at 1203-04, 1208-09.
37. Id. at 1207-08.
38. Id. at 1210 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 1211 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 1213 (Thom-
as, J., concurring).
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had suggested.39 Scalia was concerned about the growing power of
agencies to interpret their own rules without notice and comment
oversight.40 Justice Thomas agreed with Justice Scalia's opinion, and
expanded on the separation of powers concerns posed by deference
to administrative agency interpretations.41 In a separate opinion, Jus-
tice Alito agreed that the prior precedent was incompatible with the
APA but that there was concern that interpretive rules would have
substantive impact.42 The ping pong match between administrative
agencies such as the NLRB, the DOL, the EEOC, and the courts has
produced one or two decisions in each Term in the Supreme Court
that have changed the balance between these agencies and the
courts.43
C. DHS v MacLean: What is Law?
One of the common patterns in labor and employment law is the
Court's mistrust of administrative agencies, which often leads to deci-
sions that disadvantage workers. Department of Homeland Security v.
MacLean was also in the "mistrust of administrative agencies" theme
this Term, but in this case, the mistrust of agencies helped the worker
in this post-9/11 case.44 Upon receiving a tip about a possible plot to
hijack U.S. planes in July 2003, the Transportation Security Admin-
istration (TSA) notified federal marshals that all missions on flights
from Las Vegas would be canceled until the next month.4 Air Mar-
shal Robert MacLean was concerned enough about the threat of dan-
ger to the public that he contacted a reporter at MSNBC and at-
46tempted to create a news story. MSNBC ran the story, and several
members of Congress criticized TSA's decision to cancel marshals on
flights from Las Vegas.47 Soon after, TSA reversed its decision but
then investigated MacLean and his role in the story.48 MacLean's con-
tact with MSNBC was deemed an unauthorized disclosure of sensitive
security information, and he was removed from his position as an air
39. Id. at 1211-12 (Scalia, J., concurring).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1213-25 (Thomas, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 1210 (Alito, J., concurring).
43. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014); Christopher v. SmithKline Bee-
cham, Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
44. See 135 S. Ct. 913 (2015).
45. Id. at 917.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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marshal.49
MacLean challenged this action, arguing that the information he
revealed was not classified at the time he received it and could not be
classified after-the-fact.0 MacLean challenged the action before the
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) available to federal em-
ployees, arguing that he was protected under the Whistle Blower Pro-
tection Act as well.51 The MSPB decided that MacLean's actions did
not fall under the WPA because they were "prohibited by law."52 The
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed and held that MacLean's
actions were not "specifically prohibited by law."53
In the opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts affirmed the
Federal Circuit, and decided that the language in the exception that
allows for prosecution of disclosures "specifically prohibited by law"
means that Congress has to decide what is "prohibited by law." 4 Sure-
ly, the meta-discussion of what counts as "law" will continue in the
rarefied air of the Supreme Court chambers.
The Court's decision in MacLean provides needed clarity for mil-
lions of federal employees, but its impact on the protection of whis-
tleblowers may be limited. Further, as MacLean's case itself shows,
many federal employees will first go through the Merit Systems Pro-
tection Board, where many claims will stop before even getting to the
federal courts like MacLean's.55
D. M & G Polymers v. Tackett: Non-Polarizing Labor Law
The Court's only case of the Term involving collective bargaining
was M & G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett,"6 which dealt with retir-
ees' health care, but did not have the polarizing aspects of other re-
cent cases involving either the health care decision of the Term" or
the public employee bargaining cases of prior Terms. 8 Nonetheless, it
led to a decision which, although unanimous in the result, displayed
49. Id. at 918.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (2012)).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 923.
55. See id. at 918.
56. 135 S. Ct. 926 (2015).
57. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (upholding by a 5-4 margin the subsidies for
states to expand Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act).
58. E.g. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014); Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local
1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
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some differences of opinion about how the lower court should evalu-
ate the claim on remand.5 9
The underlying statute in M & G Polymers, the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act (LMRA), has long provided a framework for the
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. The question be-
fore the court was how to interpret the silence of the collective bar-
gaining agreement (CBA) on the question of retiree health benefits.6"
Retirees from an M&G plant in West Virginia filed suit under the
LMRA and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) arguing that prior CBAs (from 2005 to 2008) guaranteed
full coverage of healthcare benefits without any contribution or any
cap on costs; since the cap was not included in the ERISA documents
or the CBAs, the retirees argued that they were not subject to contri-
butions or a cap on their health care.6 1
The district court dismissed the retirees' complaint, and they ap-
pealed to the Sixth Circuit.62 The Sixth Circuit reversed the lower
court based on its reading of prior precedent, known in shorthand as
"Yard-Man," which created several inferences in favor of vested re-
tiree benefits, and concluded that the employees would not have left
the uncertainties of retiree health benefits up to future negotiations.63
After remand to the district court for a bench trial, the court found in
favor of the retirees, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment.64
In an opinion authored by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court
reversed the Sixth Circuit and its reliance on the Yard-Man decision.
6 5
Four justices, in a concurring opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg,
agreed that the case should be remanded, but seemed to want to
make sure that the lower court not put a "thumb on the scales"
against perpetual retiree benefits, the way that Yard-Man might do in
favor of perpetual retiree health benefits.66 Instead, Justice Ginsburg
reminded the lower court first to examine the entire context of the
agreement.67 Then, after considering all the relevant industry practices
if the court concludes that the contract is ambiguous, it may "turn to
59. See M & G Polymers, 135 S. Ct. 926.
60. Id. at 933.
61. Id. at 931-32.
62. Id. at 932.
63. Id. (citing Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace, & Agric. Implement Workers of Am.
(UAW) v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir. 1983)).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 937 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 938.
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extrinsic evidence, for example, the parties' bargaining history."68 Jus-
tice Ginsburg, along with the other three justices appointed by Dem-
ocratic presidents (Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan), joined in the de-
cision to remand on the understanding that these principles would be
followed by the court below.69
Ever since the Steelworkers Trilogy gave the federal courts a
primary role in interpreting collective bargaining agreements, federal
courts have long allowed the usual rules of contract law to be dis-
placed by federal common law governing the interpretation of collec-
tive bargaining agreements.7 ° This deference was tested in the recent
M&G Polymers case.71 In M & G Polymers, the issue was whether re-
tiree health benefits were to be granted in perpetuity.72 Although the
Court remanded the case to be decided in light of its holding, it is
likely that the health benefits at issue will not be found to be granted
in perpetuity.73
E. Mach Mining v. EEOC: The Agency Strikes Back?
The power of administrative agencies was at issue in Mach Min-
ing, LLC v. EEO C.74 An applicant filed a charge with the EEOC
against Mach Mining Co. for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act.75 Normally, when this happens, the EEOC attempts to conciliate
the charge. The question in Mach Mining was whether the EEOC's
failure to conciliate deprived it of jurisdiction to litigate the case.7 6
Before suing an employer for discrimination, the EEOC must
use informal methods of conciliation and mediation to get the em-
ployer to comply with the law.77 In Mach Mining, the EEOC alleged
that the Company had discriminated against a class of women by re-
fusing to hire them as coal miners.78 The EEOC sent Mach Mining a
letter alerting the Company to the allegations and that someone from
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See generally United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers
of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
71. See M & G Polymers, 135 S. Ct. at 933-34 (majority opinion).
72. Id. at 937.
73. Id.
74. 135 S. Ct. 1645 (2015).
75. Id. at 1650.
76. Id. at 1651.
77. Id. at 1650.
78. Id.
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the Agency would be in touch to attempt conciliation.79 A year later,
the EEOC sent Mach Mining a letter saying that its conciliation ef-
forts had failed and that it was preparing to sue.8"
In defense to the suit, the company countered that the EEOC
had failed to conciliate the claim in good faith."1 In its reply, the
EEOC argued that its efforts to conciliate were not subject to judicial
review.2 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the
EEOC, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the EEOC's
conciliation efforts are subject to judicial review, but that review is
limited. 3 The theory behind the decision is that although judicial re-
view is important to make sure that conciliation happens, it is not the
role of the courts to review the quality of conciliation efforts.
4
In this hyper-polarized environment, a requirement that concilia-
tion take place might not change the hardened positions of the par-
ties. Nevertheless, employment discrimination is a sufficiently divisive
area that adequate conciliation is important. While it may not have
been a complete victory or a complete loss for the EEOC, by increas-
ing the Agency's incentive to conciliate, even under limited judicial
review, perhaps more cases will be resolved before litigation.
F. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch: The "Look Policy" Gets a Second
Look
Another showing of near unanimity, though with differing ra-
tionales, was E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc."5 Aber-
crombie & Fitch (A & F) has stores throughout the country with sev-
eral lines of clothing. 6 A & F's "Look Policy" prohibits caps as part of
an image the company wants to project through the dress of its em-
ployees. 7 When Samantha Elauf interviewed for a sales position with
A & F she wore a headscarf."8 The manager who interviewed Elauf
decided she was an impressive candidate, but was concerned that the
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1650-56.
84. Id. at 1656.
85. 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015).
86. Id. at 2031.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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headscarf might violate the store's Look Policy.9 There was a dispute
about whether the managers discussed the religious nature of the
headscarf. °
The managers decided not to hire Elauf, and the EEOC sued on
her behalf.91 The Tenth Circuit held that Elauf's claim should be dis-
missed because an employer, it reasoned, could not be liable for fail-
ing to accommodate a religious practice until the employer has actual
knowledge of the need for an accommodation.92 The Supreme Court,
reversed the lower court's grant of summary judgment for the em-
ployer, holding that an employer can be found liable under Title VII
if the employee can show that the assumed need for a religious ac-
commodation was a motivating factor in the decision not to hire the
employee. 93 In an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Court held
that the intentional discrimination provision of Title VII prohibits
"motives, regardless of the state of the actor's knowledge."94
Justice Alito wrote a concurring opinion where he agreed the
facts of the case were sufficient to show that A & F had knowledge,
but he further emphasized that the statute requires actual
knowledge.95 He cited his concern that if there were no knowledge re-
quirement, employers could be liable without fault. 96
Justice Thomas wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part, though his only real agreement with the Court's opinion
were the two grounds for liability for discrimination under Title VII -
disparate treatment and disparate impact.97 Besides that, he would
hold that the Look Policy did not disfavor anyone and that the Court
was redefining intentional discrimination. 98 The application of a neu-
tral policy, he wrote, cannot constitute intentional discrimination. 99
According to Justice Thomas, the Court's decision leaves open the
possibility that an employer who "does not even suspect the practice
in question is religious can be punished for intentional discrimina-
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2033-34.
94. Id. at 2033 (emphasis in original).
95. Id. at 2034-35 (Alito, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 2036.
97. Id. at 2037 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
98. Id. at 2038.
99. Id. at 2037.
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tion.,"100
The Abercrombie & Fitch case also represents an important
counterweight to the cases that prevent liability for uniforms and
"looks," such as Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals case from 2006 that upheld Harrah's policy that
their cocktail servers should wear makeup. 1°1 On the other hand, there
is a good chance the decision will mostly be limited to situations
where the employee is looking for a religious accommodation. In this
case and the next one, the Court seems to be conflating straight dis-
crimination and accommodation, and disparate impact and disparate
treatment.
G. Young v UPS: Accommodation of Pregnant Workers
In one of the closely watched cases of the Term, the Court found
in favor of Peggy Young, a part-time driver for United Parcel Service
(UPS), whose doctor advised her that she should not lift more than
twenty pounds because of her pregnancy. 1°2 Because UPS required
drivers to lift as much as seventy pounds, the Company refused to al-
low Young to drive or offer her an accommodation.103 Young filed a
lawsuit against UPS, alleging violations of the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act (ADA) and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA),
part of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.1 4 The trial court granted
UPS summary judgment, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.1 5
The lower courts reasoned that UPS was not actively discriminat-
ing against Young on the basis of pregnancy and that the weight re-
strictions operated the same against her as any other similarly situat-
ed coworker. The Fourth Circuit also dismissed Young's claim under
the ADA because pregnancy is not a disability under the ADA.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Breyer, re-
versed the Fourth Circuit and found that UPS should have not grant-
ed summary judgment.1 6 Justice Breyer painstakingly went through
the facts that should have precluded summary judgment for the em-
ployer. Among these was the fact that the collective bargaining
100. Id. at 2039 (internal quotations omitted).
101. 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
102. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1344 (2015).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1347.
106. Id. at 1356.
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agreement between UPS and the union representing Young required
the employer to provide temporary "inside" alternative work assign-
ments to employees who had lost their DOT certifications due to fac-
tors such as a failed medical exam, a lost driver's license, or involve-
ment in a motor vehicle accident.1 °7 Further, the manager of UPS'
Capital Division told Young that, while she was pregnant, she was
"too much of a liability" and could "not come back" until she "was no
longer pregnant."1 °8 These facts, as well as examples of those accom-
modated with different conditions, such as knee injuries and foot in-
juries, showed that Young was treated differently than others similar
in their ability or inability to work.109 Of course, this is the language of
the PDA, which is at the heart of the case. Was Peggy Young treated
similarly to other workers, or only non-pregnant workers? The Court
majority held that the policy should be viewed in light of other work-
ers with conditions preventing them from being drivers, and thus
summary judgment for the employer was inappropriate.110 The lower
courts must determine whether there are legitimate, nondiscriminato-
ry reasons for treating pregnant employees different than non-
pregnant workers who also cannot perform a particular task required
by the employer.111
Moreover, the plaintiff can then show that the reasons the em-
ployer gives for not accommodating the pregnancy are a pretext in
that the failure to offer pregnant workers the same accommodations
as non-pregnant workers results in a significant burden on pregnant
workers.112 From that, the plaintiff can show that the employer's rea-
sons to justify this inequality in accommodations are simply not
strong enough to justify the inequality, and from that a jury could in-
fer intentional discrimination.
113
Three Justices dissented, with Justices Scalia writing one opinion
and Justice Kennedy writing another.114 Justice Scalia's dissenting
opinion revives the debate about whether the plaintiff is receiving
special treatment due to her pregnancy, rather than the equal treat-
107. Id. at 1346.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1346-47, 1348 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)).
110. Id. at 1353-55.
111. Id. at 1354.
112. Id. at 1354-55.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1361 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1366 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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ment that the PDA was intended to provide.115 In his separate dissent,
Justice Kennedy agreed with Justice Scalia that the Court's opinion
risks conflating disparate treatment and disparate impact. "In so do-
ing," Justice Kennedy concluded, "[T]he Court injects unnecessary
confusion into the accepted burden-shifting framework established in
McDonnell Douglas v. Green.
The win for the plaintiff in Young is perhaps the most divisive of
the workplace cases this Term, and it is notable that it does not in-
clude an administrative agency, although the Solicitor General sup-
ported the plaintiff in this case. The disagreement between the major-
ity and the dissent represents the latest chapter in the ongoing debate
about pregnancy discrimination under Title VII, which led to the pas-
sage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.117 Nevertheless, the
Young decision will be an important interpretation that will be a
touchstone for future courts.
H. Other Big Decisions of the Term: Workplace Implications
Perhaps the most noted case of the Term was Obergefell v.
Hodges, where the Court held that the states' denial of marriage
rights to same-sex couples violated the Due Process and Equal Pro-
tection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.118 The 5-4 decision at
the end of June 2015 was a watershed moment for the gay rights
movement, which had achieved several victories in state courts and
legislatures but had yet to win the right to marry nationwide.11 9 The
Obergefell decision was rightfully seen as one of the more progressive
decisions of the Court in recent years, thus marking the Term as one
of the most progressive in recent memory.
The Obergefell decision did not settle the employment discrimi-
nation against gays and lesbians that still violates no law in twenty-
eight states,12 ° nor the potential benefits issues that will arise if em-
ployers refuse to extend the same benefits to same sex couples that
115. See id. at 1362-63 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 1368 (Kennedy, J. dissenting) (citing 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
117. Id. at 1353 (majority opinion) (citing inter alia Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125
(1976)).
118. 135 S. Ct 2584 (2015).
119. See id. at 2597.
120. See Non -Discrimination Laws: State by State Information - Map, ACLU, <https:!
www.aclu.org/map/non-discrimination-laws-state-state-information-map> (last viewed Dec. 3,
2015). An additional ten states prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in public employment.
In Your State, LAMBDA LEGAL, <http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-your -state> (select "work-
place" tab) (last viewed Dec. 3, 2015).
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they do to other married couples. To effectively deal with these issues
nationwide, amendments to Title VII and ERISA are needed. The
Employment Non-Discrimination Act, which has been a possibility
for almost two decades, would amend Title VII and bar private em-
ployers from discriminating in employment even in the absence of a
state law prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination.' Given the
politics of Washington, however, it seems very unlikely that there will
be progressive workplace legislation until after the next election.
The decisions in King v. Burwell, upholding the subsidies to
states to expand Medicaid and establish exchanges,"' and Texas De-
partment of Housing v. The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., hold-
ing that disparate impact liability is available under the Fair Housing
Act, 123 were also among the progressive decisions of the Term. These
decisions do not have obvious workplace law implications, but there
will be workplace implications of both decisions. Inclusive Communi-
ties, in particular, will have an effect on Title VII's causation require-
ment, and may have furthered kindled the debate over disparate im-
pact theory.1 24
III. CONCLUSION: A GOOD TERM FOR EMPLOYEES, OR
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES?
By a basic percentage indicator, whether the employer or the
employee prevailed, the Term was a largely a good one for employ-
ees. Employees or agencies prevailed in five of the seven cases above
-Abercrombie & Fitch, Perez, MacLean, Mach Mining, Young- and
lost in two - M&G Polymers and Integrity Staffing Solutions. 125 The
ones lost by employees may have the greatest impact in the areas
where many claims are being contested - the LMRA and the FLSA.
Indeed, as most of the employee claims in the court's labor docket are
coming from administrative agencies, the cases that were not brought
by the EEOC and DOL, the cases lost involved individual plaintiffs
without the help of an administrative agency were pro-employer (In-
121. S. 815,113th Cong. (2013).
122. 135 S. Ct 2480 (2015).
123. 135 S. Ct 2507 (2015).
124. Noah Zatz, The Many Meanings of "Because Of': A Comment on Inclusive Communi-
ties Project, 68 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 68 (2015).
125. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015); Perez v. Mtge.
Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct 1199 (2015); Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 135 S. Ct 913
(2015); Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct 1645 (2015); Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
135 S. Ct 1338 (2015); M & G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct 926 (2015); Integrity
Staffing Sols., Inc. v. Busk, 135 S. Ct 513 (2014).
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tegrity Staffing Solutions and M&G Polymers).126
In the first part of 2015, the Court granted review in three cases
that can implicate workplace statutory claims. In DIRECTV, Inc. v.
Imburgia, the Court will again decide whether the California courts
should have enforced arbitration clauses that disallowed class
claims.12 The California courts refused to enforce DIRECTV's arbi-
tration agreement barring class claims.128 The outcome of this decision
will affect the litigation of a number of employment claims, including
under the FLSA and Title VII. In Green v. Donahoe, the Court will
have to resolve a Title VII question that has split the circuits: whether
the statute of limitations for constructive discharges runs from the
time that the plaintiff leaves the job or at the time of the last discrimi-
natory act.
29
On the other hand, there are three constitutional cases that are
likely to be closely ideologically divided. The first is another chal-
lenge to the University of Texas affirmative action program in Fisher
v. University of Texas at Austin.130 In 2013, the Court voted to remand
the Fisher case back to the Fifth Circuit to ensure strict scrutiny was
applied to the affirmative action program."' After remand, the Fifth
Circuit upheld the program again, and now the case is back at the Su-
preme Court. 13 2 With Justice Kagan recused from the case because of
her work in the Solicitor General's office before taking the bench, the
case will again hinge on Justice Kennedy's view of affirmative action
programs in higher education. The ramifications of the decision on
the diversity of higher education will ultimately affect the profession-
al workforce.
Finally, in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, the
Court will hear a challenge to the constitutionality of agency fees in
the public sector,133 where the plaintiffs will try to overturn Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education.134 In this case, Dianne Friedrichs and
other teachers brought a constitutional challenge so they could pay
126. M & G Polymers, 135 S. Ct. at 926; Integrity Staffing Sols., 135 S. Ct. at 513.
127. Imburgia v. DIRECTV, 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190 (Ct. App. 2014), review denied (July 23,
2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 1547 (2015).
128. Id. at 192.
129. 760 F.3d 1135 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (2015).
130. 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cit. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 2888 (2015).
131. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
132. Fisher, 135 S. Ct. 2888.
133. No. 13-57095, 2014 WL 10076847, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 18, 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct.
2933 (2015)
134. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
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nothing to the union that represented them, the California Teachers
Association.135 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals summarily dis-
missed her constitutional challenge to California's agency shop law
that required her to pay any dues to the union that represented her
for collective bargaining or grievance processing purposes.136 The de-
cision to review the Ninth Circuit's decision in Friedrichs, especially
in light of recent decisions such as Knox v. SEIU Local 1000137 and
Harris v. Quinn,138 suggests a willingness to overturn Abood, but since
only four justices can agree to hear a case, it may not be the occasion
to overrule Abood.
The Friedrichs case portends another closely divided public sec-
tor labor law case in the mold of several others discussed above. The
Supreme Court continues to be ideologically divided, and workplace
law is an extremely polarized and polarizing field, particularly in an
election year, so observers can expect more division in the very near
term. Thus, the seeming consensus among the justices during the Oc-
tober 2014 Term on workplace law cases may indeed be vanishing
soon.
135. Friedrichs, No. SACV 13-676-JLS CWX, 2013 WL 9825479, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5,
2013), aff'd, No. 13-57095, 2014 WL 10076847 (9th Cir. Nov. 18, 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct.
2933 (2015).
136. Friedrichs, No. 13-57095, 2014 WL 10076847, at "1.
137. 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
138. 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).
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